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1. ELIOT'S SWINBURNE : A REAPPRAISAL OF THE PROBLEM OF 
REFERENCE VIA LITERARY CITICISM 
Eliot defines his poetics via his criticism, and the way he criticizes 
Swinburne is of peculiar importance for his main critical concept : the 
objective correlative 
As a matter of fact the essay which Eliot has dedicated to ‘Swinburne 
as a poet’ ends with a statement which sounds crucial to the poetical 
project of Eliot, being centered, as it is, upon the relation between (the) 
language and its objects. 
 "The bad poet dwells partly in a world of objects and partly in a world of 
words, and he never can get them to fit. Only a man of genius could dwell so 
exclusively and consistently among words as Swinburne". 
 Though this statement is one of admiration for Swinburne's 
genius, it can hardly be interpreted as an appreciation of his work. 
Indeed, as Eliot clarifiesi : 
 “Language in a healthy state presents the object, is so close to the object 
that the two are identified ... [But] They are identified in the verse of Swinburne 
solely because the object has ceased to exist, because the meaning is merely the 
hallucination of meaning, because language, uprooted, has adapted itself to an 
independent life of atmospheric nourishment. In Swinburne, for example, we see 
the word “weary” flourishing in this way independent of the particular and 
actual weariness of flesh or spirit." 
Eliot’s criticism is that the language of Swinburne copes with objects, 
making them disappear, and in this way his meanings become 
“hallucinations”. Swinburne brings (the) language to an independent life 
“dwelling exclusively among words". But for Eliot this is not only a defect of 
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expression, but of thought. Indeed in the other essay dedicated to 
Swinburne, where he is analyzed as a critic,ii Eliot states: “Swinburne 
stops thinking just at the moment when we are most zealous to go on." 
In both cases we have a man of genius, but who is so fascinated by words 
to 'stop thinking' and to devoid language of meaning. Swinburne is able 
to produce effective statements, only because they appear to be 
tremendous as those we make in our dreams. 
It is quite evident, then, that the most crucial point for Eliot’s poetic 
project, the use of objectives correlative to express precise emotions, 
finds in Swinburne a real counterpart, because in his poems meanings 
are mere ‘hallucinations’ and language is devoid of its own reference, in 
order to produce pure music, and these poems are effective only insofar 
as they evoke tremendous dreams. 
Now it becomes intriguing for the contemporary reader to 
reappraise this criticism after the controversy about the linguistic abyss 
of postmodernity, and the new sprung of a 'Reality Hunger'.iii After all 
Eliot is invoking a referential nature of poetry against its conception as 
pure verbal music, without any precise reference, except for vague 
emotions and an atmosphere of nourishment. 
The question of the objective correlative could be renewed precisely 
in relation to this actual debate. What is at stake for Eliot here does not 
seem to be 'reality' or truth, but 'meaning' in relation to objects; I 
understand that for most of the people today the relation between a 
word and an object is perceived only in terms of 'reference' and 
reference is appraised only in terms of truth. But I maintain that this is a 
very limited way to cope with words and objects and their reciprocal 
relations. The matter here, I think, is rather a question of how a text 
 
4                                 CARDOZO ELECTRONIC LAW BULLETIN                              [Vol. 19 
 
produces its meaning independently of its truth, and so beyond the 
mere problem of reference. 
I think that what Eliot is stating is that a poet like Swinburne 
produces meaning through the music of words. This is not the way 
meaning comes out, for instance, from Prufrock. Even if in this poem 
there is a distinct musicality, it conveys a meaning to audience through 
'objects' : sawdust restaurants, oyster shells, one night cheap hotels, 
skirts that trail along the floor, cups, marmalade and tea... and so forth. 
Maybe never as in Prufrock the 'I' has been such a 'state of the objects'. 
From this standpoint Swinburne is the perfect antagonist of the 
Tuscan poets Eliot admired so much. (The) Provence, for instance,  to 
take an 'object' comparable to the Tuscans’ imagery, is depicted by 
Swinburne - according to Eliot - in the following terms: 
“Swinburne defines the place by the most general word, which has for him its 
own value. “Gold,” “ruin,” “dolorous”: it is not merely the sound that he wants, 
but the vague associations of idea  that the words give him. He has not his eye on 
a particular place, as [Dante’s] Li ruscelletti che dei verdi colli / Del Casentin 
discendon giuso in Arno…” 
It is, in fact, the word that gives (to) Swinburne a thrill, not the 
object. And what he wants is even worst, for Eliot, than mere music : it is 
precisely  those 'vague associations of idea’ that are always the target of 
his critical judgement. 
I think we must remember that the matter here is purely esthetic. 
Swinburne's poems produce meaning via the music of words, and they 
aim just at evoking  vague associations of idea, trying to provoke a 
reaction in the reader, which is effective when it becomes 'tremendous'.  
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This is patently the opposite of the esthetics of modernism in its 
reappraisal of tuscan poetry against the victorians. All this has nothing 
to do with (the) 'reference' even if it has a lot to do with the content of 
words, and the relation between language and the world, in 'aesthetic' 
terms. 
Prufrock, or The Waste Land, are certainly not less fictitious than any 
of Swinburne's poems, but fiction here is reached through objectives 
correlative to attain its scope, in a time when for Eliot the 'only' way to 
evoke precise emotions was to evoke them by means of their objective 
correlative, that's to say by 'objects'.  
Therefore I argue that we can really appreciate Eliot's critique of 
Swinburne's poetry only developing further the ontology intrinsic to this 
critical concept, and the way it can help us to reframe our received ideas 
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2. WORDS AS SOUNDS AND WORDS AS VIEWS 
I presume that the most durable part of Eliot's contribution to a 
theory of language and literariness can be seen in the sharp opposition 
between the music aspect of words and the visual nature of them, as it is 
envisaged in this essay on Swinburne.  
We are all used to conceive words as sounds, especially after that the 
theory of language has been reframed in modern terms by De Saussure. 
His main point was, indeed, that since words are sounds, there is but an 
arbitrary connection between language and the world. It is quite 
apparent that, for instance,  'brot' and  'pain' are very different sounds 
and therefore that the way a language designates (the) 'bread' is totally 
arbitrary. Besides if words are sounds we can try to follow the music 
nature of language moulding verses after it and so starting to dwell in a 
world of pure words. This is actually what Tolkien amused to do 
inventing elfin poems which naturally are but a collection of sounds 
giving the atmosphere of what we presume to be ‘elfin’. 
Of course there is much truth in this approach: languages do possess 
a their own distinct intonation and musicality, and when we listen to a 
foreigner speaking his own blend (of what?) we are captured by how 
different are his sounds from ours. But what is at stake in the theory of 
objective correlative, taken as a theory of (the) literary language, is the 
'visual' aspects of phrases, I mean the possibility for words and phrases 
to 'depict' in literary terms an object, a fact, or a chain of events. In this 
way we 'see' facts and objects in phrases if they are precise enough, as we 
do when we read Dante, or Cavalcanti. In the measure in which they 
may be seen as 'ideas' they are visual constructs, as the greek term 
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undeniably suggests, and a visually precise linguistic construct is also a 
thought, and not a vague association. 
From this standpoint, and if we look for the inner links making 
'modernism' something real, and not a mere gathering of different 
authors under a comfortable, or for the most of time dis-comfortable 
label, the interest of Pound for Chinese script is certainly not bizarre. 
Western scripts, moulded as they are on phonetic signs point to the 
sound-nature of words, and try to reproduce it. A Chinese Character 
may have phonetic elements in itself but is essentially an 'image' 
rendering the visual nature of words apparent. The 'sign' for Wang, 
King, is a vertical line connecting three horizontal lines, earth, man and 
heaven. Here we 'see' the king in its ritual role to connect the universe 
into his 'kingship'. There is hardly something arbitrary in this visual-
sign, and it has nothing to do with the actual sound of the word. 
What  is important is that in this way the ‘word’, seen as a character, 
captures and communicates the essence of the 'political' idea behind 
this theory of 'kingship' as it becomes embedded in language as its own 
visual representation. 
Now the matter is : what is the word, the vision, the sound or the sign 
? 
In Western scripts (script è sceneggiatura, writing?) the word is 
undoubtedly the sound, and the signs are just chosen to represent it. 
But also in Western blends words are much more than their sounds and 
transcript. Let's take the latin term for Wang, which is Rex. It is 
undeniable that also the 'sound' Rex actually represents an 'image'; it is a 
visual word. Indeed Rex if formed by a reference to Rectum, that’s  to say: 
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‘Straight’, di-rectum, diritto, which in medieval latin, and in to-day italian, 
designates also the Law, and therefore there is a visual connection 
between the King, and the Law, and what is Straight. It is not only a 
conceptual link, but a visual one, since the sound evokes the image of 
the straight line: this line, dividing right and wrong, is the ‘objective’ 
correlative of the sound, being also a precise political idea of (the) 
Kingship. 
These kinds of visual links are normally framed as etymologies, but, if 
we take the theory of objective correlative seriously, they are more visual 
than merely etymological. Once again we 'see' a particular political 
theory of kingship in the word for King, and we ‘see’ a very different 
political theology in the Chinese character for ‘Wang’. Under this 
respect the 'sound' of the word is quite immaterial.  
What is the more striking here is how much the visual theory of 
language,that I presume to be at the root of Eliot’s critical work on 
Swinburne,  is important for the theory of translation, especially of 
poems. 
When we translate a poem we certainly cannot render the original 
music or sound of it, but we can translate a 'conceit' made by John 
Donne rendering it quite perfectly in a foreign language, just because it 
is a vision, and as such it is a thought. Fun as it can be, if we conceive 
the language more as visual than as music, we can understand 
translation better. What is at stake behind a word is a view, and maybe 
the word itself is a view-device, which has an arbitrary sound. 
It is very important here to understand how vision is different from 
reference. Vision is representation, and as such it is always a going 
beyond reference by its very essence; it is always, by definition, to 
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supersede the mere reference. The matter is not that Wang and Rex 
refer(s) to the King, but that these terms represent the King in different 
ways, and that, at this point the question if they have or not the same 
referent is a matter of debate, even if it is true that in a novel, but maybe 
not in a book of comparative law, we will translate both of them by the 
English term King. 
It is quite clear, for me, that if a word is a view, it is meaningless to 
ask for the 'objectivity' of a word, especially when it designates with 
precision an object. The most precise the word is, the most it embeds a 
view, which, as such, can never be neutral or simply objective. 
The phrase 'a word is a view' means that the 'object' is captured into 
the word by a certain representation of it, which is used to bring it to 
others in a certain way. This entails, so long as we have to do with 
physical objects, that languages do represent the world in different 
terms but not arbitrarily. Especially when we deal with 'social' or 
'political' objects, it is true that a King, a Wang and a Rex are not really 
‘the same thing’, and this is effectively true: they have never been the same 
political institution, and this 'fact' is perfectly caught by the words used 
to denote this institution. The difficulty of translation does not arise 
from the nature of language, but represents the differences of political 
arrangements and conceptions. 
In this way - I think - we can try to appreciate how far Eliot is 
developing, in his essays on Swinburne, a ‘modernist’ theory of (the) 
literary language, which has nothing to do with the structuralist paradigm 
imposed on linguistics by the De Saussure’s, and his followers’, 
interpretation of the nature of words in term of signs and sounds.  
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3. OBJECTIVES CORRELATIVE AS ONTOLOGICAL DEVICES 
If words are not simply arbitrary sounds with a conventional 
reference, but complex devices of thought, capturing reality and 
‘governing’ the excess of meaning of objects in visual terms, the theory 
of objective correlative becomes an ontological theory about language 
and reality, shaping their relation in an unexpected and unusual way. 
This idea is connected by Eliot to his theory of Allegory. This is not a 
mere rhetorical device but the product of a mind educated to have 
visions. An allegorical poem, like Dante’s Commedia, is to be thought as 
the precise report made by the poet of his actual visions; of his thoughts 
as they can be expressed by a mind educated to have and refine visions. 
We have no more visions, but only thoughts, since we are no longer 
educated to have them. But in a world like Dante’s, a poet was thinking 
though images, and his (script) (qui non va, writing?) was a way to 
translate views into words to further develop a concept. Under such a 
theory the ‘correlative objective’ is the modernist formula for Allegory, 
and since allegory must refer to objects and facts, living exclusively 
among  words, as Swinburne does, is abandoning thoughts in favor of 
hallucinations; and we all know how much for Eliot poetry had to be an 
‘intellectual’ enterprise, since to express a precise emotion we need the 
same amount of intelligence needed to express a precise idea . 
(Attenzione al fatto che allegory da De Man è vista in senso derridiano 
come differimento, non come conceit. Ma già, poi rispondi sotto). 
It is of intriguing importance to notice that Northrop Frye 
considered the ‘conceit’ of the metaphysical poets, the symbolisme and 
the objective correlative as a kind of anti-allegorical imageryiv. But his 
theory his based on a distinction between implicit and explicit which 
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does not capture the nature of the relationship between allegory and 
correlative objective. He distinguishes between an imagery which is 
explicit in its reference as “… the continuous allegories, like The 
Pilgrim’s Progress and The Faerie Quenne” and the imagery which is 
becoming “…the most elusive, anti-explicit and anti-allegorical”.  From 
this standpoint it is certainly true that the baroque ‘conceit’ and the 
correlative objective are less explicit than the Pilgrim’s Progress, but I do 
not think that here Frye has reached the bulk of the matter. The 
problem is not being elusive or explicit in these terms. A correlative 
objective is anti-elusive in its reference to a precise object, even if the 
meaning, let’s say of the Waste Land, is produced by its deferment and 
its fragmentation. Prufrock keeps elusive being constructed by pure 
correlative objectives that are, all, very clear images. By contrast the 
meaning of the Faerie Quenne remains highly elusive on many points, 
even if the allegorical device employed is perfectly patent. 
The question is not then reference and meaning as such but the very 
possibility of an ‘ontological reading’ of Eliot’s theory about language, 
words and objects. 
I do not wont to plunge into the details of the birth of the concept of 
‘correlative objective’, but there is an often bypassed reference which is 
important here to remind, especially because it lies outside (of) the 
literary field, as it is to be found in the work of a German jurist Adolf 
Reinachv who has been a pupil of Husserl. (Alcunisostengo che l’abbia 
trato da Husserl) In his theory of legal promises he distinguishes the 
‘state of mind’ of the promisor from his ‘correlative objectives’, for 
instance the written instrument embodying in words his promise. This 
point is of great importance since it was on Reinach’s work that John 
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Austin (ha anche scritto Sense and Sensibilia, alludendo alla sua 
omonima, che se non sbaglio deriva da Russell) built his famous work 
on ‘How to do things with words’,vi which in turn began the basis of the 
actual social ontology developed by John Searlevii. In Reinach, Austin 
and Searle there are ‘social objects’ , like contracts, marriages and so 
on, having an ontological status different from purely physical objects, 
like mountains, and from pure state of minds. Here words do assume a 
legal and social character as they have ‘correlative objectives’. Now the 
parallel with Eliot, and his criticism of Swinburne, shows once again the 
necessity to  back to the metaphysical standpoint of his early dissertation 
on Bradley. It is in this work that we find the same problem of the 
relation between states of mind and objects wonderfully stated by Eliot 
in the following terms: 
“I” am a state of my objects”viii 
What we can envisage in this thought, in relation to the critique of 
‘dwelling exclusively among words’, is the possibility for Eliot of an 
‘ontological reading’ of words, imagery, and states of mind. After all if 
the only way to express a precise emotion is to produce its correlative 
objectives, this is so because an emotion has correlative objectives; there 
really is an ontological link between states of mind and objects. 
I suggest to use ‘ontological’ because this term is, in this context, 
stronger and more precise than ‘metaphysical’. It is not a matter of 
‘entities’ lying somewhere at the root of things, but a matter of how 
objects, physical, social, and so forth, embody thoughts and feelings. In 
an allegory, as in a correlative objective, the objects become  devices 
which locate subjects and emotions, and a poem, in these terms, is a 
rendering of these devices. 
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 4. THE ONTOLOGY OF READING 
The analysis of Eliot’s criticism to Swinburne as a poet discloses, I 
think, from my standpoint, the very possibility for an ‘ontological 
reading’ of texts as implicit in Eliot literary theory. Texts are objects, 
containing social objects, words, pointing at other physical and social 
objects, as chains of events. Words, especially, have a visual nature, 
constitute(s) (build? Create?) (themselves) an imagery, by which we can 
capture precise thoughts and emotions, since both are linked as it was 
known by the Elizabethans and the Tuscans before the great 
dissociationix of XVII and XVIII century, which brought the world of 
ideas far from that of feelings. The great effort of modernism, as 
interpreted by Eliot, can be framed in terms of restoring the way of 
thinking which preceded this dissociation in relation to the new 
landscape of objects of the modern urban town. In order to do this we 
must abandon the victorians, and especially that kind of romanticism 
which decayed in the brillant but void associations of words and music 
trying to evoke vague emotions where meanings become hallucinations. 
What relevance can such poetical project have for us to-day? 
I think that the most promising path lies in its reappraisal for a 
different reconstruction of the problem of ‘reference’.  
If a word is more a vision than a sound, and it is a device, a social 
object working as a device, the real matter is not that of reference in 
terms of the word X corresponding to the external referent y, nor if 
there is or not a y corresponding to it. The matter becomes how 
thoughts and emotions are located and redirected by these visual 
devices which are our words, which - being visions - must necessarily 
include objects as constituent parts of our thoughts and emotions. 
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In a way Eliot, precisely as he defines himself at the opposite of 
Swinburne, can be a guide toward an extension of the ‘Visual Turn’ 
even into the proper realm of language. 
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